The Great Leveling
A great leveling is occurring between the political systems of Macau and Hong Kong – one that not only irons out differences between the two local governments, but moves them both closer to the system of mainland China.
The longstanding, on-and-off pattern of centripetal pressure
has expedited again in the past year. Indeed, the governance of China’s two
Special Administrative Regions has always appeared much the same to central
authorities in Beijing, despite the two cities’ vastly different historical and
cultural contexts.
Beijing refused an initial Portuguese offer to handover
Macau in 1974, citing a desire to reclaim Macau and Hong Kong at the same time.
Functional constituencies – the hallmark form of indirect suffrage during the
Portuguese colonial era – were grafted into Hong Kong’s new Legislative Council
in 1985. About the same time, state newspapers floated the idea of combining
Macau and Hong Kong into a single SAR.
When explaining a draft of the Macau Basic Law in 1993, Lu
Ping, the Secretary-General of the Macau Basic Law Drafting Committee (and also
then-director of the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office), stated:
Because the State's basic
principles and policies towards Hong Kong and Macau are identical, in drafting
the Basic Law of Macau Special Administrative Region, we took care to make it
essentially identical to the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region regarding the general structure and major principles. At the same time,
we also paid special attention to Macau's reality to ensure that the Basic Law
reflects Macau's characteristics.
Indeed, Hong Kong and Macau affairs are
managed by the same entity, and same personnel, within the central government.
The Macau Government itself has voluntarily
taken steps toward congruence. In 2009, Macau adopted an Article 23 national
security law originally drafted for Hong Kong. And the Macau Government amended
its electoral laws to reflect Beijing’s interpretation of Article 104 of the
Hong Kong Basic Law during the oath-taking controversy of 2016.
An apparent leveling of the two political
systems has expedited since the central government’s introduction of the
National Security Law regime directly to Hong Kong in 2020.
Most notably, the National People’s
Congress passed a “decision on
improving the electoral system of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region”
in March 2021. This “reform” bill is officially intended
to “overhaul” the city’s electoral system. It has two major parts.
First, it will transform the bipartite
Legislative Council (½ directly elected, and ½ functional constituencies) into
a tripartite orientation (directly-elected; functional constituency; and now
those selected by a government committee responsible for vetting candidates for
the city’s Chief Executive). This mirrors Macau’s Legislative Assembly, whose
constitution is 14 directly-elected seats, 12 functional constituency seats,
and 7 seats appointed by the city’s Chief Executive. Indeed, Macau may have a higher
proportion of directly-elected seats at the end of the day, although they are
selected via a party-list system rather than Hong Kong’s single-member
constituency system.
Second, it will create a candidate qualification
review committee that ensures only “patriots” run for seats. Virtually all
members of the pro-democracy camp were already purged one way or another –
jail, exile, or retirement – before its establishment.
The impact of the NSL regime on Hong Kong’s
political system was so sudden and shocking that Macau looked liberal in
comparison. That didn’t last long.
On July 10, 2021, Macau disqualified 21 democratic candidates
from running in its upcoming legislative elections, including members of the
Associação de Próspero Macau Democrático, Associação de Novo Macau, and
Associação do Novo Progresso de Macau. The reason, according to the President
of Macau’s Electoral Affairs Commission, was that “We have found evidence that
these candidates did not uphold the Macau SAR’s Basic Law.” Evidence presented
against one veteran pro-democracy lawmaker, Ng Kuok Cheong, included photos
taken with a Hong Kong democratic politician, at a June 4 Tiananmen vigil, and
during a tour to Taiwan during the island’s presidential elections.
This disqualification has led to intense debates on the floor of
the Macau Legislative Assembly, a side effect of which may be collecting more
evidence against those politicians who express sympathy for the disqualified.
In the end, a great leveling is occurring
between Macau and Hong Kong – a leveling that moves both political systems together,
and closer to that of mainland China itself. If it continues, one might brace
themselves to expect further disqualifications in Macau, or the eventual
adoption of at-large party-list elections in Hong Kong – the final major
idiosyncrasies between the two cities.
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